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Tania Lațici
A microscopic creature whose size reaches 
that of a grain of rice at the utmost could teach 
NATO more survival lessons than one would 
think. The tardigrade has survived all five mass 
extinctions and is over 500 million years old. 
Like NATO, the tardigrade survived the 
nuclear challenge and even outer space. It is 
hard to find a more resilient animal from which 
NATO can draw inspiration for its ability to 
adapt to and withstand the most extreme 
conditions.  
To remain relevant and powerful in a dynamic 
threat landscape NATO needs to do what it 
has always been doing: adapt. Yet by 2030 
NATO not only needs to adapt. Just like the 
tardigrade, it needs to hyper adapt. Four areas 
are key: redefining defence and deterrence; 
agreeing on the math; internal renewal; and 
rebuilding public support. Money, politics and 
nostalgia are not enough to keep the Alliance 
alive. It is time to get creative. 
 
 
REDEFINE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DEFENDED 
AND DETERRED  
Adapting its raison d’être is no new task for NATO. 
It refocused its mission from territorial defence 
and deterrence during the Cold War to crisis 
management and out-of-area operations after 
9/11. Since 2014, Russia’s attack on Ukraine, 
airspace provocations, offensive cyber operations 
and foreign influence operations have seen the 
Alliance multitasking and combining its original 
and its expeditionary missions.  
 
However, new conventional threats such as 
malicious disinformation campaigns and electoral 
interference taking place in the framework of 
great power competition between the US and 
China are in a different league. NATO is 
expected to act on issues such as climate change, 
ensuring technological superiority, and no least, 
pandemics, on which traditional instruments of 
territorial defence and crisis management have 
little to offer. Here’s where the tardigrade would 
get creative.  
 
The first step is to intensify cooperation with the 
European Union (EU). There is no need to 
duplicate. The commitments in two EU-NATO 
 
 





declarations (2016 and 2018) already encompass 
most of the above challenges. The EU’s leverage 
in areas such as sanctions, geoeconomics, 
research, digital, climate, and, most recently, 
defence, are wholly complementary to NATO’s 
hard power. A nascent joint approach to hybrid 
warfare is one example. Improving military 
mobility is the example par excellence and can 
serve as a blueprint for policy-specific 
cooperation. If anything, the coronavirus 
pandemic has demonstrated the value and the 
urgency of civil-military approaches. This 
cooperation can extend to making the armed 
forces more environmentally sustainable, 
stimulating greater public-private partnerships to 
access cutting-edge technologies, strategic 
communication, cyber-sanctions – and more. 
 
These are low-hanging fruit. At the top of the tree 
is dealing with China. Increasing the Alliance’s 
resilience to Chinese sharp power requires the 
EU’s geoeconomic and regulatory heft. NATO 
needs to work out how China’s military build-up 
and a potential blockage of access to the global 
commons would affect its core mission and 
mandate. Does NATO’s ‘area of responsibility’ 
extend as far as Asia?  
Both organisations are engaged in hard thinking 
about their future: the NATO2030 process and 
the EU’s Strategic Compass. These strategic 
considerations for the future should be more 
than compatible; they should be complementary. 
EU and NATO leaderships should prevent them 
from developing in isolation from each other. To 
get around political sensitivities European 
NATO members could set up informal 
frameworks, as they did with the 1968 Eurogroup 
or the 1976 Independent European Program 
Group, to coordinate a common approach. A 
stronger European pillar in NATO is in line with 
EU ambitions for strategic autonomy. For its 
part, NATO can further polish its information-
sharing reflexes and practice trust-building 
instead of box-ticking. Appointing director-level 
counterparts or special representatives in the EU 
and in NATO to deal specifically with the 
relationship would help with the ownership of 
the portfolio. A Foreign Affairs article on 
NATO’s future, penned during the author’s 
month and year of birth, argues what scores of 
thinkers argue still today: “a new transatlantic 
bargain must be based on the new political 
imperatives on both sides of the Atlantic”. The 
above actionables would require minimal political 
capital but bring substantial political gains, 
substantiating the transatlantic optimism 
stemming from the new Biden administration.  
AGREE ON THE MATH 
Metrics for measuring Allies’ contributions to 
collective defence are out of date. Contributions 
should reflect the new threats the Alliance is 
facing. The (in)famous 2%-of-GDP, agreed after 
Russia annexed Crimea, is both myopic and 
increasingly obsolete. It does “little to indicate the 
effectiveness of the output it enables”, the 
simplistic connection to the GDP fails to account 
for economic downturns, and the metric is blind 
to actual defence output.   
 
The merit of the 2% is that it focuses politicians’ 
minds. That’s a keeper. But to fulfil its Secretary 
General’s ambition for a 360° military, global and 
political strength, the Alliance must do better.  
Contributions should be assessed holistically and 
include efforts to decarbonise the defence sector and 
to fight disinformation, investments in societal crisis 
management, resilience-boosting programs, women, 
peace and security, cyber defence measures and 
critical infrastructure safety, as well as civil-military 
capability development, including military mobility.  
A twin reform should target the NATO Defence 
Planning Process to reflect up-and-coming challenges 
and to be better linked with the EU’s own 
instruments, particularly the Capability 
 
 





Development Plan and the Coordinated Annual 
Review on Defence. Burden-sharing could thus 
become a more effective division of labour, 
matching capabilities with Allies’ domestic 
priorities. This would be a win for NATO and a win 
for Allies at home. 
 
INTERNAL RENEWAL  
NATO should think about emulating the substance 
responsible for the tardigrade’s 500th birthday: the 
damage suppressor. This protein offers protection in 
the most extreme of circumstances by preventing its 
DNA from snapping apart. The name seems tailor-
made for NATO. The Alliance’s DNA is part 
solidarity and part liberal values - Articles 2 and 5 of 
the Washington Treaty.  
 
NATO’s values are both its strength and its weakness. 
While NATO should remain faithful to upholding 
and embodying liberal democracy, respect for the rule 
of law and human rights, it should not let itself be 
undermined from within. If not in the name of the 
values themselves, then for security. As experts point 
out, “less democratic countries [are] more vulnerable 
to the threats posed by information manipulation and 
election interference” and military interoperability 
stands to suffer. Suggestions include an accountability 
mechanism when Treaty-based principles are in 
danger of being violated or a special ombudsperson 
responsible for NATO’s core principles.  
 
Since all NATO decisions are taken by consensus, 
solidarity is embodied in the one-for-all and all-for-
one principle. While Allied disagreements are normal 
and healthy, they should be uncompromising when it 
comes to upholding solidarity.  
 
As in September 2020, when Secretary-General 
Stoltenberg brought Allies around the NATO table to 
(successfully) help deescalate the Eastern 
Mediterranean crisis, the Alliance’s role as a political 
consultation forum should be expanded. Former US 
President and NATO’s first Supreme Allied 
Commander Eisenhower himself said that NATO’s 
“real strength rests in our union”, while Dean 
Acheson emphasised the need for “full and candid 
discussion in NATO – even if informally conducted” 
– to solve the Alliance’s internal crises during the 
1950s and 1960s. With an Atlanticist President once 
more in the White House, the United States can use 
its leverage to bring leaders to the NATO negotiating 
table – formally as well as informally.   
 
NATO should think more holistically about Article 5. 
As Mira Rapp-Hooper argues, “the time has come to 
consider the conflict thresholds that might reasonably 
apply to nonmilitary domains” but escape the 
Alliance’s current understanding of an armed attack. 
A credible deterrent against information-warfare and 
offensive cyber operations could be in the form of 
new collective-defence triggers. Rapp-Hooper rightly 
points out that NATO “should define which kinds of 
nonmilitary attacks rise to the level of major 
aggression and thereby trigger security guarantees”. 
The response can equally be non-military but backed 
up by a possibly looming threat of military retaliation. 
This is a task not only for the NATO2030 process but 
also for the EU Strategic Compass, particularly as the 
latter has finalised its threat analysis. This is the type of 
thinking needed to create a robust damage 
suppressor. 
 
 REBUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT 
Donald Trump’s election in 2016 has shown 
multilateralists that international organisations cannot 
be taken for granted. The public no longer grasps 
NATO’s role and purpose intuitively. Ironically, 
NATO’s mission was more clearly communicated to 
the public before the advent of the internet than it is 
now. As Rapp-Hooper puts it, politicians “need to tell 
the alliance story differently so that policymakers and 
the public understand the continuing promise of 
collective self-defense”. NATO should avoid being a 
victim of its own success – it might not be obvious to 
younger generations that Euro-Atlantic security is 
partly responsible for peace and prosperity. This 
 
 





means moving away from an elite langue de bois and 
avoiding communication efforts that millennials and 
GenZ-ers immediately sniff out as promotional. 
Engaging youth is an existential concern. Not only do 
these people vote but they become leaders and 
influencers themselves. While millennials and GenZ-
ers care about transatlantic ties and are concerned 
about the new conventional threats, it is not a given that 
they understand how NATO serves them. Initiatives 
such as the NATO2030 Young Leaders, of which the 
author is fortunate to be a part, are a great start but 
these efforts must go beyond the ‘new global elite’ of 
well-travelled International Relations graduates. One 
suggestion could be introducing pilot-projects in 
schools across (and even beyond) the Alliance aimed 
at increasing crisis awareness, cyber-hygiene and 
digital literacy. This would benefit everyone. Another 
is making room for a youth representative at NATO’s 
adult table to directly feed into future policy and 
decision-making.  
The tardigrade’s evolution has demonstrated that 
resilience is a moving target. It is not an end but a 
continuous process. Rethinking the future of the Pax 
Atlantica means thinking outside the box about  
 
 
becoming more inclusive, more accountable, more 
relevant and more sustainable. Nostalgia is not what 
will keep the Alliance alive in the next century, but  
creativity just might. 
The author would like to thank Sven Biscop for his ever-useful 
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